Dangerous Dichotomy of Priorities
The decisions that the Kremlin reaches "about punishing Estonia" will show what, after all, is its priority today in international politics - "grand imperial style" or "economization" in the interests of the major corporations (energy and transport ones, above all). Russian foreign olicy is increasingly frequently encountering this conflict of approaches.
This is what happened, in particular, during the visit that Czech President Vaclav Klaus just concluded to Russia. On the one hand, Moscow displayed to its Czech partners an extreme degree of displeasure at Prague's consent to accommodate US missile defense elements. This, to all appearances, cannot fail to have a negative impact on relations between Russia and the Czech Republic.
At the same time the Kremlin made a considerable effort to maintain favorable conditions for the development of exclusive economic relations with the Czech Republic, for Gazprom has long been displaying special interest in working there.
In the case of the Czech Republic at the present time it is just about possible to separate these two approaches -- the globalist approach concerning the sphere of national and international security and the economic approach geared to meeting the interests of Russian corporations.
It will be far more difficult to achieve an analogous result with Estonia, if it is possible at all. In this case, within the framework of the "grand style" policy, Moscow's stance is dominated not by a specific vision of the problems of international security but by a great power's grudge against a small one for having been so disrespectful, in Russia's opinion, toward the memory of heroes of the Great Patriotic War.
Because of this, Russian public opinion – at least, the opinion of a certain number of our fellow citizens – has been fired up by shots of "Estonian police brutality" on the national television channels and by the frenzied response of "ours" ("nashi"), "locals" ("mestnyye"), and others in front of the building of Estonia's diplomatic mission in Moscow.
Russia must display not only parliamentary, television, and street hysterics but also the efficacy of its formidable displeasure. But that is the snag. It will hardly be possible to proclaim an emphatic boycott of Estonian commodities that are encountered by the statistically average Russian every day.
Atlet cheese is consumed by an insignificant number of our compatriots. Estonian sprats are clearly less popular than Latvian ones (if only the latter could be boycotted "to keep them company," for "the Balts" act in concert!). As for giving up Estonian butter, which is offered by many Russian airlines as part of their in-flight catering, this could be noticed only by passengers of these airlines, and they are not that numerous as a percentage of Russia's population.
In short, this clearly is not on a par with the ban on popular Georgian wines and Borjomi mineral water. But whether the Kremlin would venture to damage the business interests of Russian companies which engage in the transit of Russian energy sources across the territory of Estonia or which own a substantial proportion of the assets of Tallinn Seaport – that is a big question.
If the Russian leadership is unable to overstep these business interests for the sake of demonstrating its might, then both the very policy of "grand style" and its attendant tactic of political and psychological pressure on a partner will show their ineffectiveness and will to a considerable extent discredit themselves.
As an instrument for resolving foreign policy tasks, however, this policy has already demonstrated its ineffectiveness. Neither the economic sanctions against Georgia (although officials in Moscow now deny that they existed at all), nor the ending of cultural ties with it, nor the deportations of Georgian gastarbeiter from Russia, nor the campaign to combat Georgian criminality brought Tbilisi back into the sphere of Russian influence.
What is more, having overcome the Russian sanctions under conditions of apparently total economic dependence on Russia, Georgia started moving still more determinedly in the direction of NATO.
The tactic of mass emotional reaction does not yield success in other directions either. The recent mass indignation on the part of high-ranking Russian officials and parliamentarians at the Department of State's report on human rights also had little impact, when it comes right down to it, on US policy toward Russia.
If similar political mobilizations on foreign policy grounds continue to be so ineffective, then sooner or later this will discredit the "grand style" policy in the eyes of public opinion.
If a power which calls itself a great power periodically resorts to massive pressure on inconvenient partners but achieves nothing, will it be perceived as a great power both among its compatriots and in the world community? It is entirely likely that the "grand style" policy, with its attendant attempts to mobilize public opinion, pursues not so much international as internal political ends.
With the help of such mobilizations against an external enemy it is possible to "tighten screws" inside the country step by step and divert public attention away from undesirable problems for the regime, gradually pushing the political system in the direction of authoritarianism. In the preelection year mass campaigns against external enemies can also fulfill a tactically compensatory function, substituting, for example, for the lack of a positive agenda.
But also in the international arena the "discrepancy" between the "economization" of the foreign policy course and the "grand style" policy may become so considerable that this will create obstacles to the advancement of Russian business interests.
After all, if a country that emphasizes its allegiance to European civilization starts employing methods from the Arab street's arsenal and also tries to pressure the domestic policy of partners (and this, whether we like it or not, is just how people in many European capitals and the European Commission have rated Russia's stance toward Estonia), then sooner or later they will politely but firmly reduce contacts with that country. At the same time there may also be another dimension to the problem of the widening "discrepancy."
If business interests start to become so prevalent in a state's foreign policy that they lessen the value of attempts to realize particular global or regional goals which go beyond these interests, then in time the foreign policy of that state will inevitably become futile, ending up a hostage to somebody's corporate and group aspirations.
After all, a corporation's main goal is to make a profit. A state, particularly in international politics, cannot confine itself just to such a goal.
